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I. Introduction
In the past year, while the legislative front was relatively quiet,
Pennsylvania saw significant cases involving a trespass claim based upon
drainage due to hydraulic hydrofracturing operations (Briggs), zoning of oil
and gas operations (Gorsline, MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Resources,
LLC, and Delaware Riverkeeper Network), oil and gas lease disputes
(Butters and Slamon), regulatory challenges (Marcellus Shale Coalition and
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC), and title disputes (Woodhouse Hunting
Club, Inc. and Clutter).
II. Judicial Developments
A. Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp.
The Supreme Court held that proposed use of gas wells was not of the
same general character as public utility services facility, reversing approval
of conditional use permit.
The Fairfield Township Board of Supervisors approved unconventional
gas wells operated by Inflection Energy, LLC, as a conditional use in
Residential-Agricultural District in Lycoming County.1 Resident objectors,
the Gorslines, appealed the decision to the Lycoming Court of Common

1. Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 186 A.3d 375, 380 (Pa. 2018).
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Pleas, which reversed the Board.2 Inflection appealed this decision and the
Commonwealth Court in turn reinstated the Board’s approval.3 Plaintiff
objectors appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.4
The Township Ordinance did not list gas wells as a permitted use in the
District.5 Inflection applied for a conditional use under the Ordinance on the
basis that the use was similar and compatible to permitted uses in the
District and was not permitted in any other zones.6 Inflection argued that
the wells were a similar use to a Public Service Facility under the
Ordinance, which was defined to include power plants, substations, water
treatment plants, pumping plants, and sewage disposal facilities.7 The
Supreme Court determined that the approval was not supported with
substantial evidence that the uses were similar8.The Court found that
testimony at the hearing was inconsistent as to whether gas wells were
similar to a public service facility.9
The Court held that the uses were not similar because the proposed gas
wells were not by a utility or by a municipality or governmental agency, but
instead by a private for-profit commercial business.10 The Court also noted
that there was no evidence that the extracted gas would benefit the local
citizens of the Township.11 The Court found that the Ordinance discouraged
industrial uses in Residential-Agricultural Districts, and public service
facility uses were only allowed “because they provide the necessary
infrastructure for residential and agricultural development in the R–A
district, including public utility services (water, sewage, electricity, natural
gas, water treatment) as well as more general uses that support residential
and agricultural development (e.g., hospitals, bed and breakfast inns, public
recreation and agricultural businesses).”12
The Court rejected the approval permit but cautioned that “this decision
should not be misconstrued as an indication that oil and gas development is
never permitted in residential/agricultural districts, or that it is
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 383.
See id. at 387.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 387.
Id. at 388
Id. at 385.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387
Id. at 387-88.
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fundamentally incompatible with residential or agricultural uses.”13 The
Court noted that the Township could amend the Ordinance to permit oil and
gas development in some of its zones.14
Justice Dougherty, joined by two other Justices, authored a dissent
arguing that the Court improperly substituted its judgment for the Board,
which had implicitly credited testimony that the uses were similar, and the
Court ignored substantial documentary evidence that supported the
similarity of the uses.15
Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department of Environmental Protection
The Supreme Court upheld an order enjoining an administrative agency’s
enforcement of oil and gas operation regulations currently subject to a
pending challenge.
Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. concerns a challenge to
executive agency authority.16 This is a preliminary decision related to
enforcement of regulatory provisions that are currently being challenged on
the merits in a parallel action. The Court’s decision is not the final word on
the validity of those challenged regulations, but sheds some light on how
the Commonwealth Court and the Supreme Court may analyze the
challenged provisions.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
Commonwealth Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining the
enforcement of regulations promulgated under Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas
Act of 2012 (“Act 13”).17 The Marcellus Shale Coalition (“MSC”), acting
on behalf of itself and its members, filed a petition for review in the
Commonwealth Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging
the validity of certain regulations relating to unconventional oil and gas
activities governed by Act 13.18 The regulations are located in Title 25,
Chapter 78a of the Pennsylvania Administrative Code.19 The
Commonwealth Court, acting in its original jurisdiction, issued an order
enjoining enforcement of regulatory provisions pertaining to “public
resources”; area of review, impoundments and site restoration pending a

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 392 (Dougherty, J., dissenting).
Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 185 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2018).
See id. at 1007
Id. at 986.
Id.
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final resolution of the challenges to the regulations on the merits.20 The
Supreme Court affirmed portions of Commonwealth Court’s order, but did
not agree that injunctive relief was warranted on certain types of water
impoundments or the challenged site restoration provisions of Act 13.21
The public resources provisions obligated drilling permit applicants to
provide pre-application notices relative to “public resources.”22 That term is
not defined in the regulations, but includes “’common areas on school’s
property or a playground’ and ‘other critical communities.’”23 As expressly
stated, the permit applicant must notify each “public resource agency”
which manages a public resource of the proposal.24 This would include
playground owners and the like. The court agreed with MSC’s challenge to
the public resources provision, concluding that MSC “raised a colorable
argument that the regulations improperly expanded the list of protected
resources” to potentially include all publicly-owned property, as well as
privately owned property open to the public.25 The court concluded that
MSC had satisfied the “clear-right-to-relief” prong for injunctive relief as to
public resources which would include “common areas on a school's
property or a playground” and “species of special concern,” which would
include playground owners as public resource agencies.26 The court stated
that these provisions gave rise to irreparable harm per se and, additionally,
irreparable harm due to the “cost [of] compliance with these provisions—
costs that well applicants will be unable to recover . . . if this Court should
rule in favor of MSC on the merits.”27
MSC challenged the validity of the “area of review” regulations related
to the obligations of well operators relative to nearby wells and the
operators of those wells.28 The Environmental Quality Board estimated the
cost of compliance with these sections was $11 million.29 That sum may not

20. The statutory bases for this review can be found at: 25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.1, 78a.15(f)
and (g) (“public resources”); 25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.52a and 78a.73(c) and (d) (area of review),
25 PA. CODE §§ 78a.59b(d) and (e), 78a.59c (impoundments), and 25 PA. CODE § 78a.65(a)
(site restoration).
21. Marcellus Shale Coal., 185 A.3d 985, 1007 (Pa. 2018)
22. Id. at 987.
23. Id. at 987 (citing 25 PA. CODE § 78a.1).
24. Marcellus Shale Coal., 185 A.3d at 988.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 989.
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 990.
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be recoverable, even if MSC was successful on the merits.30 MSC
challenged the provisions through a number of arguments, but the court
found that MSC raised a substantial legal issue regarding the
reasonableness of the monitoring and remediation provisions.31
Determining that MSC established irreparable harm that outweighed any
harm in refusing to grant the injunction, and concluding that an injunction
would restore the parties to the status quo, the court granted a limited
preliminary injunction.32
MSC’s challenge to the impoundment provisions took issue with the fact
that impoundments built in compliance with DEP regulations were not
grandfathered in to the new standards.33 Notably, the court found that “the
new rules arose, not from a change in the law, but from a change in DEP's
interpretation of longstanding law; and existing impoundments permitted
and built to DEP standards would have to be retrofitted or closed under
DEP's new interpretation.”34 The law, itself, remained the same—the
change was in DEP’s interpretation of that law.35 The court found that
operators were denied procedural due process if DEP enforced the
impoundment provisions applied to existing, previously compliant
impoundments.36 Therefore, the court denied the injunction as to new
impoundments, but applied the injunction to enforcement against existing
impoundments.37
As to the site restoration challenges, the court found that MSC raised a
substantial legal question as to whether or not the site restoration provisions
impose erosion and sediment control measure requirements on well owners
and operators in excess of what is required under the Clean Streams Law. 38
DEP had described these provisions as “mere clarifications of [the] existing
law.”39 The court noted that DEP’s position was undermined “to the extent
Section 78a.65(d) purports to abrogate any exemptions contained in the
Clean Streams Law.”40 As such, the court determined that MSC had raised

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
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a substantial legal question and thus had satisfied the clear-right-to-relief
prong.41
Though litigation on the merits of the Petition continues in
Commonwealth Court, DEP and the Environmental Quality Board appealed
the order enjoining enforcement to the Supreme Court.42
The Court’s standard of review on a preliminary injunction is for abuse
of discretion, but where there are issues of statutory interpretation involved
the Court review is de novo.43 Regarding the abuse of discretion standard,
the Court noted:
We do not inquire into the merits of the controversy, but only
examine the record to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the action of the court below. Only if it
is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree or that the
rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied
will we interfere with the [decree].44
Under this standard of review, the Court found the Commonwealth Court’s
order based upon reasonable grounds as to the preliminary injunction of
enforcement of the public resources, area of review and a portion of the
impoundment regulations.45 The Court, however, found that the preliminary
injunction of the remaining impoundment rules and the restoration
provisions was not supported by any reasonable grounds.46 The Court
distinguished the rulemaking from the procedural due process issue noted
by the Commonwealth Court. Here, DEP would not be making an
adjudication of the rights of the operators and owners, but instead is using
procedural mechanisms pursuant to the state’s police powers.47 As such, the
Court reversed the preliminary injunction on well development
impoundments. The Court affirmed, however, the injunction against
enforcement of the provisions related to centralized impoundments.48
Finally, the Court reversed the preliminary injunction against enforcing
the site restoration provisions.49 The Court, reviewing the potential conflict
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 995-96 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 997, 1001, and 1005.
See id. at 1005–06.
See id. at 1003–04.
See id. at 1005.
Id. at 1006.
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between the Chapter 78a regulations and the Clean Streams Law de novo,
did not find a potential conflict.50 The Court noted that if it did find a
conflict, Chapter 78a would prevail as the more specific regulation.51 As
such, the Court concluded that MSC had not demonstrated a clear right to
relief in relation to the site restoration provisions.52
B. Pennsylvania Superior Court
Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production Company.
The Superior Court held that plaintiff stated claim for trespass to oil and
gas estate by oil and gas drainage from hydraulic fracturing operations
across property lines, rejecting application of the Rule of Capture.
In Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co.,53 plaintiff landowners filed a
complaint in the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas against
defendant oil and gas operator, Southwestern Energy Production Company
(“SWN”), alleging that defendant’s operation of unconventional wells on
adjacent parcels caused gas drainage from the plaintiffs’ property by
hydraulic fracturing.54 The complaint alleged counts of trespass and
conversion, and sought punitive damages.55 SWN filed an answer and new
matter, alleging that the claims were barred by the rule of capture.56
Discovery ensued and SWN subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that they did not enter the Briggs land, and that claims
for drainage based on hydraulic fracturing were barred by the rule of
capture. The trial court ruled in favor of SWN, holding that the claims were
barred by the rule of capture, and the Briggs appealed to the Superior
Court.57
On appeal, the Briggs argued that the drainage of natural gas constituted
a trespass because of the differences between hydraulic fracturing and
conventional natural gas production.58 Briggs argued that the gas on their
tract would have remained trapped in the shale formation, if not for the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
See id. at 154.
Id.
Id. at 154-55.
See id. at 155.
Id. at 156-57.
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hydraulic fracturing, citing Young v. Ethyl Corp.59 SWN argued that
hydraulic fracturing was distinguishable from the process occurring in
Young and that the rule of capture should apply to hydraulic fracturing.60
The Superior Court first noted that claims for trespass in Pennsylvania
are controlled by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, which provides
that: 61
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest
of the other, if he intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or
a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty
to remove.
The Court noted that trespass liability may extend to an actor “by throwing,
propelling, or placing a thing” beneath the surface of the land of another.62
The Court next reviewed the authority supporting the rule of capture,
which precludes liability for the drainage of oil and gas from the land of
another.63 The rule is based upon the tendency of oil and gas to escape from
land due to their “fugitive and wandering existence.”64
In Jones v. Forest Oil Co.65 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that
the rule of capture applied to oil and gas produced with the aid of
mechanical pumps. Additionally, the Court has held that the rule of capture
applied even when a landowner placed wells near the boundary line of his
property to drain his neighbor’s property, finding that the neighbor’s sole

59. Id. (citing Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975) ( determining that rule
of capture did not apply to displacement of valuable salt water brine under plaintiff’s land by
injection of water in wells on neighboring lands to produce brine)).
60. Id. at 157.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158, cmt. i).
63. Id. (citing Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa. 235 (1889)).
64. Id. (citing Browen v. Vandergift, 80 Pa. 142, 147 (Pa. 1875)).
65. 194 Pa. 379 (1900).
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remedy is to “go and do likewise.”66 The rule was more recently recognized
in Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv.67
On the nature of hydraulic fracturing, the Court relied upon the
description used in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren68:
[Hydraulic fracturing] is done by pumping fluid down a well at
high pressure so that it is forced out into the formation. The
pressure creates cracks in the rock that propagate along the
azimuth of natural fault lines in an elongated elliptical pattern in
opposite directions from the well. Behind the fluid comes a
slurry containing small granules called proppants—sand,
ceramic beads, or bauxite are used—that lodge themselves in the
cracks, propping them open against the enormous subsurface
pressure that would force them shut as soon as the fluid was
gone. The fluid is then drained, leaving the cracks open for gas
or oil to flow to the wellbore. [Hydraulic fracturing] in effect
increases the well's exposure to the formation, allowing greater
production. First used commercially in 1949, [hydraulic
fracturing] is now essential to economic production of oil and
gas and commonly used throughout Texas, the United States []
and the world.
Engineers design a [hydraulic fracturing] operation for a
particular well, selecting the injection pressure, volumes of
material injected, and type of proppant to achieve a desired result
based on data regarding the porosity, permeability, and modulus
(elasticity) of the rock, and the pressure and other aspects of the
reservoir. The design projects the length of the fractures from the
well measured three ways: the hydraulic length, which is the
distance the [hydraulic fracturing] fluid will travel, sometimes as
far as 3,000 feet from the well; the propped length, which is the
slightly shorter distance the proppant will reach; and the
effective length, the still shorter distance within which the
[hydraulic fracturing] operation will actually improve
production. Estimates of these distances are dependent on
66. Id. at 158 (citing Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907)
(1907)).
67. Id. (citing Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir.
2011)).
68. Id. at 159 (quoting Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 894
(Pa. 2013)).
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available data and are at best imprecise. Clues about the
direction in which fractures are likely to run horizontally from
the well may be derived from seismic and other data, but
virtually nothing can be done to control that direction; the
fractures will follow Mother Nature's fault lines in the formation.
The vertical dimension of the [hydraulic fracturing] pattern is
confined by barriers—in this case, shale—or other lithological
changes above and below the reservoir.69
On the issue of whether the rule of capture applied to oil and gas drained
with the aid of hydraulic fracturing, the Superior Court found only two
decisions. The first was Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr.,70 in
which the Texas Supreme Court held that the rule of capture barred a claim
for trespass predicated on drainage of oil and gas by hydraulic fracturing.
The Coastal Oil Court cited the following four justifications for its
holding:
(1) “the law already affords the owner who claims damage full
recourse;” (2) “allowing recovery for the value of gas drained by
hydraulic fracturing usurps to the courts and juries the lawful
and preferable authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate
oil and gas production;” (3) “determining the value of oil and gas
drained by hydraulic fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation
process is least equipped to handle” because “trial judges and
juries cannot take into account social policies, industry
operations, and the greater good[,] which are all tremendously
important in deciding whether [hydraulic fracturing] should or
should not be against the law;” and (4) “the law of capture
should not be changed to apply differently to hydraulic
fracturing because no one in the industry appears to want or need
the change.”71
A partial dissent criticized the majority position for relying upon the
alternate remedies of self-help and pooling, which it argued were
insufficient, and for reducing the incentive of operators to lease small tracts
within a unit.72
69. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 159.
70. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
71. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 160 (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268
S.W.3d at 14–17).
72. Id. at 160–161.
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The second case came from the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia which considered a similar claim of trespass by
the owner for a Marcellus formation lateral that passed within 200 feet of
the plaintiffs’ property.73 In that case, the landowners were under a lease
assigned to the defendant operator, but the lease only permitted pooling for
formations below the Onondaga formation, which does not include the
Marcellus formation. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the claim was barred by the rule of capture. The District Court
denied the motion, relying upon the dissent in Coastal Oil.74 In particular,
the District Court argued that the self-help remedy of drilling was
insufficient and further distinguished the decision on the grounds that West
Virginia did not have a comprehensive regulator of oil and gas operations
comparable to the Texas Railroad Commission.75 Lastly, the District Court
determined that the Coastal Oil decision neglected the rights of small
landowners.76 The opinion was subsequently vacated after the parties
settled the dispute.77
In Briggs, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was persuaded by the
reasoning of the Coastal Oil dissent and the Stone opinion. The Court
concluded that drainage from hydraulic fracturing was distinguishable from
the rule of capture because without hydraulic fracturing the gas was nonmigratory in nature.78 The Court cited the insufficiency of self-help because
of the high cost of drilling a Marcellus well and was not swayed by the
evidentiary difficulties in determining when a subsurface trespass has
occurred.79 The Court further found that applying the rule of capture would
enable operators to avoid leasing owners of small tracts.80 Finding that there
was insufficient evidence of whether SWN had trespassed on the Briggs’

73. Id. at 161 (discussing Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102,
2013 WL 2097397 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013), opinion vacated by Stone v. Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 7863861 (N.D.W. Va. July 30, 2013)).
74. Id. at 161-62.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Other than in Briggs, The Stone decision has only been cited in one West Virginia
U. S. District Court case, which described the trespass issue as “unsettled” under West
Virginia law. See Barber v. Magnum Land Servs., LLC, No. 1:13CV100, 2014 WL 5148575
(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 14, 2014).
78. Briggs, 185 A.3d at 162.
79. Id. at 163.
80. Id.
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land, the Superior Court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.81
Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt
Superior Court held that unassessed oil and gas rights were lost by prior
owner at “title wash” tax sale of unseated land
Plaintiff landowner, Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. (“Woodhouse”)
brought a quiet title action against the potential owners of severed oil and
gas rights from reservation in prior deed.82 In 1893, defendant’s
predecessors, the Hoyts, conveyed the 937 acre tract in Tioga County to the
Union Tanning Company, reserving oil, gas and mineral rights in grantors
and their heirs and assigns.83 The grantors did not notify the County
Commissioner of Tioga County of their severed interest.84 The property was
assessed as unseated (undeveloped) land.85
In 1902 the property was sold for unpaid taxes to the Morris
Manufacturing Company.86 After the tax sale but before the tax sale deed
was recorded, the Union Tanning Company conveyed the tract to the
Morris Manufacturing Company, subject to the 1893 reservation.87 In 1932
the property was sold again at tax sale, but was redeemed by the owner
after the expiration of the redemption period.88 Eventually, Woodhouse
acquired the oil, gas and mineral rights in a subsequent conveyance and
brought the quiet title action in 2011.89 The parties brought cross-motions
for summary judgment and the Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of
Woodhouse, relying upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller.90
On appeal, defendants challenged the sufficiency of proof of the tax
sales, because Woodhouse did not obtain recorded copies of the tax deeds.91
The Superior Court held that the record contained sufficient evidence of a
81. Id. at 164.
82. Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 2018 PA Super 78, 183 A.3d 453, 455 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2018).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 456 (discussing Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 636 Pa. 344
(2016)).
91. Id.
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proper sale, including minutes of the Tioga County Court showing the
acknowledgment of the sale deeds in open court, record of the sale in the
Treasurer’s Register Book, and recitals of the sale in subsequent deeds. 92
The Court also held that the title was washed prior to the 1932 sale, and that
any event, a redemption after the expiration of the redemption period would
not prevent a “title wash” of the unassessed oil and gas interest.93
Defendants’ argument that an undeveloped oil and gas interest could not
be sold at tax sale was without merit. 94 Herder Spring barred defendants
from arguing that notice was defective, as well as any other defects under
the tax sales, after the expiration of the redemption period.95
Clutter v. Brown
The Superior Court held that reservation of “one half of the oil and gas
royalty” was a reservation of one half of the royalties under existing leases,
not oil and gas in place, and reservation terminated on death of grantors.
In an unpublished decision, the Superior Court held that a reservation of
“one half of the oil and gas royalty” was a reservation of one of the royalty
interests, only, under leases existing at the time of the reservation.96 It was
not, as Defendants argued, a reservation of one half of the oil and gas in
place. The facts before the Court centered on a 1919 deed executed while
an oil and gas lease burdened the property conveyed in the deed.97 The
Clutters and the Lappings (“Landowners”) own two tracts of land in Greene
County, PA, derived from that common 1919 Deed executed by the heirs of
Louisa McVay (“McVay Heirs”).98 In June 1901, Louisa McVay entered
into oil and gas leases providing for the payment of certain royalties and
delay rentals.99 The 1919 Deed was executed while the 1902 Lease was still
in effect. The 1919 Deed read in relevant part:
Reserving, also from this conveyance one half of the oil and gas
royalty the party of the second part, however, is to have the
92. Id. at 458 (citing Bell v. Provance, 59 Pa. Cmwlth. 522, 430 A.2d 391, 392-93
(1981)).
93. Id. at 460.
94. Id. at 461 (citing Cornwall Mountain Investments, L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs
Tr., 158 A.3d 148, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)).
95. Id.
96. See Clutter v. Brown, No. 1542 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 4179747 at *5. (Pa. Super.
Ct. Sept. 21, 2017).
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id. at *1-*2.
99. Id. at *2.
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quarterly rental which is paid from quarter to quarter to prevent
forfeiture of the lease. 100
The 1901 Lease terminated and neither the Landowners nor the Defendants
ever received a royalty from that Lease.101 Landowners then entered into
leases with EQT in 2011.102 EQT withheld one-half of the royalty based on
the royalty reservation in the 1919 Deed.103 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Landowners.104 Defendants appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred by failing to find that the 1919 reservation
of one-half of the oil and gas royalty to the grantors therein constituted an
exception of an interest in real property that passed by operation of law to
the heirs of the grantors, being all Defendants.105
Considering the 1919 Deed Clause, the Superior Court stated:
We must determine whether this clause constitutes an exception
of the Property's gas and oil from the deed or whether it is a
reservation of the royalty payments received from the extraction
of gas and oil from the Property. If it is an exception, as
Gemmell contends, then it excepted a real-property right to the
oil and gas from the deed that would survive the death of the
grantor. If, however, it is a reservation, as Landowners contend
and the trial court implicitly found, then it reserved a right to
personal property—the royalty payments—that did not survive
the death of the grantor. 106
The Court then noted the distinction in terms: “A reservation pertains to
incorporeal things that do not exist at the time the conveyance is made.” 107
“However, even if the term ‘reservation’ is used, if the thing or right
reserved is in existence, then the language in fact constitutes an
exception.”108 Notably, “[i]f there is a reservation, it ceases at the death of
the grantor, because the thing reserved was not in existence at the time of
100. Id.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id. (citing Walker v. Forcey, 396 Pa. 80, 151 A.2d 601, 606 (Pa. 1959); LauderbachZerby Co. v. Lewis, 283 Pa. 250, 129 A 83, 84 (Pa. 1025)).
108. Clutter, 2017 WL 4179747, at *4 (citing Walker, 151 A.2d at 606) (other citation
omitted).
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granting and the thing reserved vests in the grantee.”109 An exception,
however, “retains in the grantor the title of the thing excepted [and because]
the exception does not pass with the grant, it demises through the grantor’s
estate absent other provisions.”110
The Court concluded that the 1919 Deed created a reservation of the
royalty payments from the oil and gas leases then in effect.111 “A lease of
minerals in the ground is a sale of an estate in fee simple until all the
available minerals are removed; this leaves the lessor with only an interest
in the royalties to be paid under the lease, which are personal property.”112
The Court concluded that the 1919 Deed reserved one-half of the royalty
payments, not one-half of the oil and gas.113 The payments, unlike the oil
and gas, were “incorporeal things that [did] not exist at the time the
conveyance [was] made.”114 Therefore, the deed created a reservation of a
right to personal property that did not survive the death of the grantor.115
C. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd.
In this case, the Commonwealth Court held that a zoning hearing board
exceeded its authority by imposing excessive conditions on an application
for a use that was a use by special exception in the proposed location.
In a panel decision on a land use appeal, the Commonwealth Court
considered the reasonableness of conditions imposed by a zoning hearing
board under a conditional use permit.116 Before the Commonwealth Court
was MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Resources, LLC’s (“MarkWest”)
appeal of a trial court order affirming the Cecil Township (“Township”)
Zoning Hearing Board's (“Board”) decision granting MarkWest's
application for special exception subject to twenty-six conditions
(“Conditions”).117 MarkWest purchased a property upon which it planned to

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MarkWest Liberty Midstream and Res., LLC v. Cecil Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
184 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 23, 2018).
117. Id.
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construct a natural gas compressor station.118 Markwest’s proposed use of
the property was allowed by the Township's Unified Development
Ordinance (“UDO”) as a special exception.119 MarkWest applied to the
Board for a special exception under the UDO in 2010.120 The Board denied
the request, which MarkWest appealed to the trial court who upheld the
Board’s denial.121 The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded
directing the Board to grant MarkWest’s special exception application.122
The Board did so on remand but attached the Conditions to the approval.123
MarkWest appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the Board and
MarkWest appealed to the Commonwealth Court.124
The Court considered four issues on appeal: “(1) whether the Boardimposed conditions exceed the Board’s authority under the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)” and the UDO; “(2) whether the
Board is authorized to impose standards separate and apart from the UDO
regarding where a particular use may be located; (3) whether the Board's
conditions are unduly restrictive and result in disparate treatment of
MarkWest's proposed use without a reasonable basis; and, (4) whether
certain of the Board's conditions are preempted by Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) statutes and regulations.”125
Affirming in-part and reversing in-part, the Court held that the Township
exceeded its authority by imposing excessive conditions on MarkWest’s
application for special exception.126
The Court reversed the trial court’s upholding of the Conditions. The
UDO allows the Board to “attach reasonable conditions and safeguards
necessary to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.”127 The Board’s
power in this regard is derived from the MPC. Notably, however, the Board
lacks the authority to amend the zoning ordinance.128 Here, the UDO
expressly allowed natural gas compressor stations as a special exception in
the location of the proposed facility. The court determined that the Board
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056
Id.
Id. at 1054.
See id.
Id. at 1057.
See id. at 1060.
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failed to make any findings that the compressor station would detrimentally
impact the health and safety of the community. 129 Without such findings,
the Board lacked the authority to impose the Conditions.130
Furthermore, the court found that the Conditions were an attempt to
dictate MarkWest’s specific business operations on the site “under the guise
of zoning regulation,” which is prohibited by the MPC.131 “Based on the
foregoing, regardless of the Board's best intentions, those Conditions not
borne from the UDO/MPC and the record are unreasonable and, therefore,
are an abuse of the Board's discretion.”132 The court ruled that many (but
not all) of the Conditions were unreasonable.133 The court did not reach the
issues related to preemption, since it had already held the Conditions
subject to those arguments were unreasonable.
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed that as a public utility, midstream
operator was exempt from local zoning ordinances in locating its pipeline
and rejected challenge based upon Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights
Amendment.
In Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., the
Commonwealth Court considered the appeal of a trial court order
dismissing appellants’ complaint and denying petitions for injunctive relief
against appellee, Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. to enjoin Sunoco’s construction of a
portion of the Mariner East 2 (“ME2”) pipeline project.134 Appellants, the
Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Maya van Rossum, the Delaware
Riverkeeper, and residential landowners Thomas Casey and Eric Grote
(collectively, “Appellants”), sought to stop construction of ME2 by arguing
that Sunoco’s construction activities violated the West Goshen Township
Zoning Ordinance (the “Ordinance”).135 The trial court sustained
preliminary objections to the complaint raised by Sunoco alleging (1) lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and a lack of authority to regulate; (2) lack of
authority to regulate based on federal law (sustained as moot); and (3) that

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. at 1068.
See id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1060.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1061–1080.
179 A.3d 670, 673-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 20, 2018).
Id.
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Plaintiffs failed to establish a substantive due process claim.136 The trial
court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.137
On appeal, the Appellants argued, among other things, that Sunoco is not
a public utility and ME2 pipeline facility is not a public utility facility and
that the Township’s Ordinance was not preempted by Pennsylvania’s
Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) because PUC does not regulate the
siting of pipeline facilities.138 The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding
that because Sunoco is a public utility regulated by PUC and is a public
utility corporation, the Township lacked authority to regulate the location of
the pipeline facility.139 The court rested on its en banc decision in Sunoco
I140 to dismiss Appellants’ challenge to ME2’s status as a public utility.141
Once the court found Sunoco to be a public utility corporation, the siting
of the pipeline is a part of the “reasonableness and safety of [ME2 that are]
matters committed to the expertise of the PUC by express statutory
language.”142 The court analyzed the Township’s actions under the
principals of both field preemption and conflict preemption.143 Field
preemption occurs when the legislature intends to occupy the entire field of
an area of law.144 Therefore, any local statute in that field is not valid.
Under conflict preemption, a municipal ordinance is invalid if it conflicts
with state law.145 A municipal ordinance conflicts with state law to the
extent it is contradictory to, or inconsistent with, a state statute.
Furthermore, “a local ordinance will be invalidated if it stands as an
obstacle to the execution of the full purposes and objectives of a statutory
enactment of the General Assembly.”146
Holding that the Township’s attempt to regulate ME2 is preempted by
the Public Utility Code, the court found that the General Assembly intended
the Public Utility Code to occupy the entire field of public utility

136. Id. at 676. (The trial court overruled Sunoco’s preliminary objection alleging lack of
standing).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 680-81.
139. Id. at 682.
140. In re Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., 143 A.3d 1000 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
141. Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 179 A.3d at 682.
142. Id. (citing 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1505).
143. Id. at 690–94.
144. Id. at 690 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair. TP., 105 A.2d 287 (1954)).
145. Id. at 690 (citing Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp.,
32 A.3d 587 (2011)).
146. Id. at 692.
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regulation.147 Moreover, the court concluded that conflict preemption barred
the Township from enacting an ordinance prohibiting the pipeline because
the Ordinance acted as an obstacle to the execution of the full purpose of
the Public Utilities Code.148
Appellants also raised an argument related to recent decisions made by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth and Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth stating the Court “set forth the clear limitations on the
General Assembly’s authority ‘to remove a political subdivision’s
implicitly necessary authority to carry into effect its constitutional
duties.’”149 Those decisions recognized limitations imposed by Article 1,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “Environmental Rights
Amendment,” hereafter, “ERA”) on the General Assembly’s power
legislate. Specifically, the ERA places a fiduciary duty upon the
Commonwealth, as trustee, to conserve and maintain Pennsylvania’s public
resources for all people, including “generations yet to come.” 150 Appellants
argued that local governments, such as the Township, shared that fiduciary
duty with “all Commonwealth agencies and entities.”151 Therefore,
Appellants maintained that “as to the public trust provisions of the ERA
Amendment, ‘the General Assembly can neither offer political subdivisions
purported relief from obligations under the [ERA], nor can it remove
necessary and reasonable authority from local governments to carry out
these constitutional duties.’”152 As such, the Appellants argued that the trial
court improperly removed the Township’s ability to carry out its
constitutionally mandated duties by finding the Ordinance was preempted
by the PUC’s authority.
Sunoco countered, arguing that “despite [Appellants’] contentions, the
ERA does not grant regulatory power to municipalities where that power is
preempted or otherwise prohibited.”153 Sunoco noted that the timing of the
municipality’s action is key to their duties under the ERA, which Sunoco
argued, “requires municipalities to make decisions and take actions they are
already empowered to take, in a manner that satisfies their duty to act as
147. See id.
148. Id. at 693.
149. Id. at 683 (citing Robinson Township, 80 A.3d 901, 977 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson Twp.
II); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 161 A.3d 911, 931 (Pa. 2017) (PEDF)).
150. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
151. .Delaware Riverkeeper Network, 179 A.3d at 684.
152. Id. (citing Robinson Twp. II, 83 A.3d at 977).
153. Id. at 687.
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trustee of Pennsylvania's public natural resources for the benefit of the
people.”154 Sunoco added that the PUC and the Department of
Environmental Protection are empowered to exercise ERA duties over the
ME2 pipeline and, in fact, had done so.155
The court declined to adopt Appellants’ argument on the Township’s
constitutional duties under the ERA for three reasons: first, both Robinson
Twp. II and PEDF were distinguishable from the present facts because
neither dealt with public utility services or facilities regulated by PUC. 156
Second, the court found that Appellants “do not explain how the [ERA]
impacts long-standing, pre-existing law involving regulation of public
utilities, without expressly referring to the topic.”157 Noting that Robinson
Twp. II and PEDF dealt with very recent enactments by the General
Assembly, the court found that Appellants “ignore the comparative timing
of the onset of legal duties, although such timing is usually a matter of
significan[t] legal analysis.”158 Finally, the court did not find that
Appellants showed how the Ordinance furthered the Township’s ERA
trustee duties or related to conserving public natural resources.159 As such,
the court did not find that the ERA protected the Ordinance from the
preemption arguments advanced by Sunoco.
D. Pennsylvania Federal Courts
Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n
The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of mineral owner’s claim for
declaratory judgment against DRBC regulation of unconventional natural
gas operations.
Mineral owner Wayne Land and Mineral Group, LLC (“Wayne”)
brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Delaware River Basin
Commission (“DRBC”) seeking a declaration that the DRBC did not have
the authority to require Wayne to obtain approval to drill and complete
unconventional gas wells in Wayne County, Pennsylvania.160

154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 688.
156. Id. at 695–96.
157. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 894 F.3d 509,
515 (3d Cir. 2018).
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The DRBC was created in 1961 to administer the Delaware River Basin
Compact (“Compact”) between Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania.161 The Compact gives the Commission a broad range of
powers to protect water quantity and quality within the Basin. Article 3 of
the Compact requires the Commission to create a comprehensive plan for
the immediate and long-range development and uses of the water resources
of the Delaware River Basin.162 The plan must include all public and private
projects and facilities which are required, in the judgment of the DRBC,
“for the optimum planning, development, conservation, utilization,
management and control of the water resources of the [B]asin to meet
present and future needs[.]”163 In 2009 the Executive Director of the DRBC
issued a moratorium on natural gas “fracking” projects without prior DRBC
approval. The DRBC has not issued any final regulations governing the
review of unconventional gas well projects.164
The DRBC filed a motion to dismiss Wayne’s complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the claim was not ripe and Wayne
lacked standing. In the alternative, the DRBC sought a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “because there was no final
agency action and Wayne did not exhaust available administrative
remedies.”165 The District Court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Wayne had alleged an economic
injury and was ripe because it only sought a declaratory judgment.166 The
District Court also found that Wayne had not failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, again citing the limited nature of the declaratory
relief sought by Wayne.167 However, the District Court sua sponte
dismissed the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), because on the merits, the
definition of “project” under the Compact included the planned drilling
operations.168
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (“Third
Circuit”), first considered the ripeness of Wayne’s claim. Ripeness is
“guided by three main considerations: the adversity of the parties’ interests,
the conclusiveness of the judgment, and the practical utility of that
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Joint App. at 386, § 13.1.).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520-21.
Id. at 521.
Id.
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judgment.”169 The Third Circuit concluded that there was adversity, given
the costs of Wayne’s compliance with the DRBC’s required showings
related to water usage and the risks of fines from proceeding without DRBC
approval.170 Second, there were sufficient facts to obtain a conclusive legal
judgment given the purely legal nature of a declaration as to the DRBC’s
jurisdiction.171 Third, a legal ruling would provide practical utility by
clarifying the legal relationship between natural gas companies and the
DRBC.172 The Third Circuit held that Wayne’s claim was ripe.173
The Third Circuit also held that Wayne had standing, based upon the
legal requirements imposed by the DRBC, the burden on Wayne realizing
the market value of its mineral resources, and the threat of sanctions for
noncompliance fulfilling the three elements of standing.174 In addition,
because Wayne was not challenging a DRBC action, but the proper
interpretation of the Compact, the “final agency action” requirement was
inapplicable and likewise the alleged failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.175
Last, the Third Circuit considered the merits of Wayne’s argument that
drilling operations do not constitute a “project” under the Compact. The
Compact defines a “project” as
any work, service or activity which is separately planned,
financed, or identified by the [C]ommission, or any separate
facility undertaken or to be undertaken within a specified
area, for the conservation, utilization, control, development or
management of water resources which can be established and
utilized independently or as an addition to an existing facility,
and can be considered as a separate entity for purposes of
evaluation[.]176
The Third Circuit was persuaded by Wayne’s argument that the DRBC read
the word “for” out of the definition, since water use is incidental to natural
gas development, not a purpose of the activity. The DRBC’s interpretation
169. Id. at 522 (citing Marathon Petroleum Corp. v. Sec'y of Fin. for Delaware, 876 F.3d
481, 496 (3d Cir. 2017)).
170. Id. at 523.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 524.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 524-25 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)).
175. Id. at 526.
176. Id. at 529 (citing Joint App. at 363, § 1.2(g) (emphasis added)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

428

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 4

of “project” would include any activity that uses water. In addition, the
court noted that it was questionable whether the quantity of water used in
hydrofracturing operations is greater than that used in other operations that
the DRBC has made no effort to regulate.177 However, the Court thought
there was some force to the DRBC’s argument that exempting
hydrofracturing projects would treat them different from other regulated
industrial water uses. The Third Circuit found that the definition of
“project” was ambiguous, denied the DRBC’s motion to dismiss, and
remanded the case to the District Court for additional fact-finding.178
Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied
defendant operator’s motion to dismiss lessors’ claim that lease terminated
due to failure to diligently develop leasehold
Plaintiff landowners leased multiple tracts in Tioga County,
Pennsylvania to lessee, who assigned those leases to operators, who, in
turn, assigned the leases to operator defendant. The lease habendum clauses
provided that the leases would be extended beyond the initial primary term
if any of several conditions were satisfied, including if “drilling operations
continue with due diligence[.]”179 “Operations” were defined in the leases
to include
any of the following: dirt work, building of roads and locations,
drilling, testing, completing, reworking, recompleting,
deepening, plugging back, repairing, abandoning or dewatering
(meaning pumping or flowing of water and/or associated
hydrocarbons from a well) of a well in search of or in an
endeavor to obtain, increase or restore and/or market or render
marketable or more valuable production of oil or gas, and/or
production, actual or constructive, of oil or gas.180
Prior to the expiration of the leases’ primary terms on December 8, 2015,
portions of leases were unitized in two drilling units. On October 10, 2016,
plaintiffs requested that defendant surrender the leases.181 Defendant
rejected the request, asserting that drilling operations on the two units were
177. Id. at 530.
178. Id. at 533-34.
179. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2018 WL 2766290, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. June 8, 2018).
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *4.
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sufficient to extend the leases.182 Plaintiff filed claims for quiet title and
declaratory judgment and defendant removed the claims to the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds. 183
Defendant then filed a motion for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for
non-compliance with the notice provisions under the leases and because its
activities were sufficient to extend the leases as a matter of law.184
The notice clause provided that “the leases shall not be terminated for
[lessee’s] failure to perform ‘unless such obligation, covenant or condition
remains unsatisfied and unperformed for a period of one year following the
express and specific written demand . . . for such satisfaction and
performance.’”185 The District Court concluded that the clause was
inapplicable to an expiration of the leases under the habendum clause,
which was akin to an automatic reversion of a fee simple determinable.186
Plaintiffs alleged that after unitization one spudded well was not further
developed and the drilling permit expired.187 Defendant argued that its
activities, including setting containment on the well pad, performing a
cement bond log, removing a bridge plug, and running a bit and scraper in
the wellbore were sufficient to extend the leases.188 The District Court held
that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, as defendant’s due diligence was a question reserved for the factfinder.189
Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied
defendant operators’ motion to dismiss lessor’s claims for breach of royalty
clause in leases by basing royalty payments on improper prices, and
deducting post-production costs, but dismissed a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff oil and gas lessor brought a class action against defendants,
Reliance Marcellus II, LLC, Reliance Holdings USA, Inc. (collectively
“Reliance”) and Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC (“Carrizo”) alleging that: a) the
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. (citing T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 276 (Pa. 2012)).
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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royalties paid to the plaintiffs under their oil and gas leases were improperly
calculated; b) that Reliance and Carrizo breached the lease by
miscalculating the production royalty as well as deducting fees and postproduction costs incurred from the sale of gas to a third party from the
royalty paid to Plaintiff; c) that Reliance and Carrizo breach the implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing in their contract with Plaintiff; and d)
that Reliance and Carrizo breached their fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff.190
Carrizo and Reliance filed motions to dismiss the complaint.191
The district court first considered the claim that royalty was paid upon an
improper price. The lease’s royalty clause provided that
[t]he value of oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon production shall be
determined on the basis of the greater of (i) the prevailing local
market price at the time of sale or use, or, NYMEX spot price as
published at the time of sale, whichever is greater, or (ii) the
price paid to Lessee from the sale or use of the gas, including
proceeds and any other thing of value received by Lessee;
provided, however, that when gas production is sold in an armslength sale transaction with an unaffiliated third party, the value
of such gas production shall be the price paid to Lessee.192
The parties contested whether the final proviso only modified provision (ii)
(as advocated by Plaintiff) or whether it modified the entire provision (as
advocated by Defendants).193 The district court found that the production
royalty payment and valuation terms of the lease were susceptible to
multiple reasonable interpretations and denied the Defendants’ motion.194
Second, the district court considered Plaintiff’s claims that postproduction costs were improperly deducted. The relevant provision in the
leases stated that “Lessee shall pay Lessor the following royalty (the
‘Royalty’), free of all costs, whether pre-production or post-production.”195
The lease did not define the term “post-production costs.”196 Reliance and
Carrizo agreed with Plaintiff that the royalty provision did not allow them
to deduct post-production costs, but Reliance and Carrizo argued that the
190. Slamon v. Carrizo (Marcellus) LLC, No. 3:16-CV-2187, 2017 WL 3877856, at *1*2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2017).
191. Id.
192. Id. at *3.
193. Id. at *4.
194. Id. at *5.
195. Id. at *4.
196. Id. at *6.
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allegations in the complaint did not allege that they deducted postproduction costs from Plaintiff’s royalties.197 Instead, Defendants noted that
the complaint alleged that the third party buying the gas deducted its costs
in calculating the price paid to Reliance and Carrizo. As such, Reliance and
Carrizo argued that the costs incurred by the third party who purchased the
gas did not fall within the definition of “post-production costs.”198
The district court found that the term “post-production costs” was not
necessarily limited to only those production expenses incurred directly by
Reliance and Carrizo. The district court concluded that because “the lease
does not clearly limit “post-production costs” to only those production
expenses incurred directly by Defendants—as opposed to those incurred
directly to third parties and passed onto Defendants—Plaintiff has
adequately pleaded a cause of action for breach of contract.”199
Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendants’ accepted sale prices for natural
gas that were well below market value, for natural gas, breached the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.200 The district court noted that
the lease did not constrain Defendants’ discretion in setting a sales price for
gas. Defendants argued that as a consequence they had no duty to sell at
any particular price. However, the district court held that Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged a claim: “Plaintiff’s claim is […] that Defendants’ are
nonetheless required by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to exercise discretion in a reasonable way by selling gas at a commercially
reasonable price [and because] there are no explicit and unambiguous terms
in the [lease] to the contrary, Plaintiff has stated a claim for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.”201
Finally, the district court held that Plaintiff did not adequately plead a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. “To allege a breach of
fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must establish that a fiduciary or confidential
relationship existed between her and the defendants.”202 “[T]he critical
question is whether the relationship goes beyond mere reliance on superior
skill, and into a relationship characterized by ‘overmastering influence’ on
one side or ‘weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed’ on the
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *7
201. Id. at *9 (citing USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 438 (3d Cir.
1993)).
202. Id. at *10 (quoting Baker v. Family Credit Counseling Corp., 440 F. Supp. 2d 392,
414 (E.D. Pa. 2006)).
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other side.”203 The district court held that Plaintiff failed to plead facts
giving rise to a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants:
“Rather, Plaintiff has pleaded the existence of a contractual relationship in
which all parties sought to act in their own interest for a mutual benefit.”204

203. Id. (quoting eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advert., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 23 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002)).
204. Id.
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